DETECTION OF AND REACTION TO CYBER ATTACKS IN A CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES SCENARIO: THE COCKPITCI APPROACH

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ABSTRACT
The protection of the national infrastructures is one of the main issues for national and international security. The FP7 MICIE project has achieved promising results by developing a secure online software architecture and by sharing information on a real time basis among local risk predictors, in order to obtain accurate and synchronized predictions using shared interdependency models. However, results of MICIE project are not enough in order to quickly and effectively react to all adverse events that may occur over the System of Systems and, in particular, to face cyber attacks. The EC FP7 CockpitCI project aims to improve the resilience and the dependability of CIs through the design and the implementation of an Alerting System that provides to CI operators an efficient tool to support them: (i) in the prevention of cyber attacks and (ii) in the implementation of consequence containment strategies in case of attack.

Keywords: Critical Infrastructure protection, SCADA systems, cyber attacks countermeasures, detection and reaction strategies.

1. INTRODUCTION
The protection of the national infrastructures (i.e. the System of Systems including energy grids, transportation networks, telecommunications systems, etc., Suter and Brunner (2008)) is one of the main issues for national and international security. There are, in principle, several approaches that should be used to this end that encompass analytical (Bobbio, Bonanni, Ciancamerla, Clemente, Iacomini, Minichino, Scarlatti, Terruggia and Zendri, 2010; Bobbio, Ciancamerla, Diblasi, Iacomini, Mari, Melatti, Minichino, Scarlatti, Terruggia, Tronci and Zendri, 2009), simulative (Ciancamerla, Foglietta, Lefevre, Minichino, Lev and Shneck, 2010; Ciancamerla, Di Blasi, Foglietta, Lefevre, Minichino, Lev and Shneck, 2009) and what-if analyses (Haines, Horowitz, Lambert, Santos, Lian and Crowther, 2005; De Porcellinis, Panzieri, Setola and Ulivi, 2008; Amin, 2002), while online approaches are less likely to emerge, due to the huge complexity. Among the others, the FP7 MICIE (Tool for systemic risk analysis and secure mediation of data exchanged across linked CI information infrastructures) project has achieved promising results by developing a secure online software architecture and by sharing information on a real time basis among local risk predictors, in order to obtain accurate and synchronized predictions using shared interdependency models (Capodieci, Foglietta, Lefevre, Oliva, Panzieri, Delli Priscoli, Castrucci, Suraci, Khadraoui, Aubert, Jiang, Spronska, Diblasi, Ciancamerla, Minichino, Setola, De Porcellinis, Lev, Shneck, Iassinovski, Simoes, Caldeira, Harpes and Aubigny, 2010). The outcome of this process is that operators receive information about the future evolution of their infrastructure with a wider perspective compared to previsions that can be generated by sector specific and isolated simulators.

While MICIE project has proved that increasing cooperation among infrastructures’ owners by sharing information leads to better previsions, such an integration is not enough in order to quickly and effectively react to all adverse events that may occur over the System of Systems and, in particular, to face cyber attacks. Cyber attacks against SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition) systems are considered extremely dangerous for CI (Critical Infrastructure) operativeness and must be addressed in a specific way. As an example, one of the most adopted attacks to a SCADA system is based on fake commands sent from the SCADA to the RTUs (Remote Terminal Unit).

In order to effectively react to a specific low level menace, there is the need to consider both the global and the local perspectives. In fact, besides obtaining a wider perspective on the state of the System of Systems, there is the need to increase the intelligence of equipment and devices that are used to influence the behaviour of the system, such as RTUs, valves, etc.

The idea to add “intelligence” to the field is not new: electro-valves for gas pipelines are available on the market that, in the case they receive a rapid sequence of open-close commands, do not perform them in order to avoid the consequence of the mechanical shock.

The CockpitCI approach, in order to overcome such catastrophic vision, aims to improve the resilience and the dependability of CIs through the design and the
implementation of an Alerting System that provides to CI operators an efficient tool to support them: (i) in the prevention of cyber attacks, and (ii) in the implementation of consequence containment strategies in case of attack.

In order to reach this goal, at low field level equipment will be provided of some kind of intelligence, allowing them to be able to perform local decisions but only in the presence of “critical” situations, i.e. those characterized by a high risk in terms of on-going cyber attack or unavailability of the communication. This approach will increase both global awareness and local decision-making capability.

2. METHODOLOGY

In the framework of giving “intelligence” to the low-level field equipment, a mandatory element to be considered is the capability of the different actuators (e.g. RTUs) to contrast cyber attacks by identifying them and operating, even in the absence of information coming from the central SCADA, in a “safe” manner. This implies to increase the “intelligence” at RTU level providing them with some form of self-healing and self-protection capabilities. However, it is important to understand that for SCADA systems currently used to monitor and control Critical Infrastructures, it is very dangerous that RTUs can perform autonomous operations or refuse to execute requested commands. To overcome such contradictory behaviour a sort of hybrid schema will be considered and developed in the CockpitCI project:

- at the level of Control Centre, the presence of an “Integrated On-line Risk Predictor” will perform an accurate situation assessment and will provide the operator with a qualitative/quantitative measurements of near future level of risk integrating data coming from the field, data coming from other infrastructures and data coming from smart detection agents monitoring possible cyber attacks.

- at field level, the schema is complemented with a smart software layer for RTUs and a detection system for the TLC (Telecommunication) network. This layer will continuously analyze the inputs and outputs of the RTU in order to prevent misuse, and will analyze the traffic on the TLC network to recognize cyber attacks.

As long as the smart layer does not receive an arming command from the SCADA, it will continue to execute commands received from the SCADA, even if there are large discrepancies between the expected commands and the ones actually received. On the other side, when the RTU is armed (i.e., there is a high risk level), the RTU may eventually neglect the received commands and actuate locally by defined ones. This implies the creation of a local vision of RTUs environment that will continuously evaluate optimal reaction strategies.

With respect to cyber attacks, CockpitCI project aims to improve resilience and dependability of CIs through the design and implementation in each CI of the CockpitCI Integrated Risk Prediction System. The main improvement addresses the detection, prevention and reaction to cyber threats. More specifically, the CockpitCI system will:

- develop and deploy smart detection agents to monitor the potential cyber threats according to the types of ICT based networks (SCADA, IP…) and types of devices that belong to such networks;
- identify, in real time, the CI functionalities impacted by the cyber attacks and assess the degradation of CI delivered services;
- broadcast an alerting message through an improved Secure Mediation Gateway at different security levels (low and high level);
- manage a strategy of containment of the possible consequences of cyber attacks at short, medium and long term.

The above-mentioned cyber threats and the assessment of consequences will be expressed in terms of risk level for a given CI of being no more able of providing its services with its target QoS (Quality of Service) in consequence of events occurring in other CIs; such a risk level will be hereinafter referred to as CI risk level. So, the CockpitCI system will be able to provide, in real time, each CI operator with a CI risk level measuring the possibility that, in the near future, he will no more be able to provide the CI services with the desired QoS in consequence of faults or cyber attacks, and from a high level point of view, the CockpitCI system will be able to provide a map of potential cyber threats on CI network.

The CockpitCI system will analyze in real time the cyber threats according to adaptive algorithms, compute the CI risk on the basis of abstract CI models (forecasting CI QoS taking indicators, accounting mutual interdependency among CIs and cyber attacks) and on a suitable set of aggregated data from raw field data, collected in real time by means of adequate interfaces.

3. DEVELOPMENT

The CockpitCI approach is based on the following concepts, models, equipment and tools:

(1) QoS prediction models. Quality of Service prediction models have the final aim of predicting the QoS delivered by interconnected SCADA and Telco networks accounting for cyber vulnerabilities and cyber attacks. The models will predict indicators of QoS delivered by the interconnected networks by adequate representation of the technological networks, their cyber vulnerabilities and adverse events, including cyber attacks (Bobbio, Bonanni, Ciancamerla, Clemente, Iacomini, Minichino, Scarlatti, Terruggia and Zendri, 2010; Bobbio, Ciancamerla, Dibiasi, Iacomini, Mari, Melatti, Minichino, Scarlatti, Terruggia, Tronci and Zendri, 2009; Ciancamerla, Foglietta, Lefevre, Minichino, Lev and Shneck, 2010; Ciancamerla, Di Blasi, Foglietta, Lefevre, Minichino, Lev and Shneck, 2010). The activity will be fed by an overview of modeling techniques and tools for cyber threats and
cyber vulnerabilities analysis of interconnected of SCADA systems and Telco Networks and SCADA systems. Prediction models will predict the attributes of readiness, reliability, security and performances of such services. Models will be built according to heterogeneous paradigms selected according to their capacity to represent the impact of adverse events (cyber threats, internal failures, network congestions and natural phenomena) on the QoS delivered by SCADA and the interconnected Telco networks. Modeling paradigms will include adequate agent based simulation, analytical dependability modeling with careful examination of scalability issues (Extended Stochastic Petri Nets, Network Reliability analyzers) discrete event simulation (based on largely known open source platforms) and Input/output modeling.

2) The design and the implementation of the CockpitCI Detection System (detection agents plus detection adaptors). This part will include research aspects (especially in terms of smart detection agents for SCADA and Telecom network) and integration aspects (taking into account existing system). Especially, this concept will include the research aspects on traffic monitoring and attack detection, i.e. new machine learning based approaches for unusual traffic event detection will be investigated. At the end of this phase, the different approaches will be evaluated and the most suitable solution for cyber attack detection will be selected. The final objective is to design and implement a set of intelligent detection agents able to identify the cyber threats. These agents will be included in a smart architecture able to be re-oriented thanks to learning strategies.

3) The On-Line Integrated Risk Predictor (IRP) which, on one hand, will allow to model the cyber-dependencies of CIs and the other functional dependencies, and, on the other hand, will permit to identify the potential cascading effects of cyber attacks or other adverse events using the right interdependency schemes provided by the modeling. The on-line IRP will also implement an accurate situation assessment to devise best responses to the actual threat and identify the part of risked CI network, and to broadcast relevant information to other CI and national/European authorities.

4) The design and implementation of the CockpitCI Secure Mediation Network in the prospect of broadcasting cascade failures and cyber alerts at low and high level.

5) The design of a CockpitCI Smart RTU Reaction System which, on the grounds of the CockpitCI On-Line Risk Predictor, will manage the strategy of containment, i.e.: (1) to block attacks, (2) to isolate infected systems, (3) to deploy tactical and operational security policies.

6) The design and implementation of the CockpitCI SCADA adaptors to extract raw data from SCADA and Telco control rooms but also from other SCADA and Telco devices (Smart RTUs, Detection Agents, etc.)

In particular, the methodology in question will be based on the following issues:

a. To identify a typology of cyber-threats and to model the cyber-interdependencies of the composite CIs system in order to identify the right peers to communicate alert messages for each type of cyber-attacks.

b. Develop a real-time Distributed Monitoring System and Perimeter Intrusion Detection System (PIDS) able to aggregate the filtered and analyzed information of potential cyber-attacks induced on SCADA systems or telecommunication systems used to support the operation of CIs and identify the potential unsecured area of the CIs. Thanks to intelligent detection agents, the monitoring system should be able to dynamically reconfigure itself in order to focus on specific threats.

c. Create a framework to allow the community of CI owners to exchange real-time information about attacks (and tentative attacks), extending the capabilities and functionalities of the Secure Mediation Gateway and of the risk prediction tool developed in MICIE project. Issues to be considered include: (i) need to exchange information among trusted CIs, not necessarily interdependent, (ii) availability of the integrated prediction tool in each CI to calculate cascading events induced by faults and cyber attacks especially in terms of QoS of Power and Telecommunication Grid, (iii) need to develop a strategic analysis tool able to calculate the potential threat of coordinated cyber-attacks on CIs.

d. Analyze strategies for automatic real-time reaction able to better manage the corrupted portion of the grids (Telco and SCADA), able to predict the time of reconfiguring the grid to reach a defined QoS level, and able to treat the corrupted system at short, medium and long term (definition of automatic procedures of treatment).

Another fundamental aspect addressed by the CockpitCI approach is the secure exchange of information across CIs and to high level authorities (national or European). The CockpitCI system, based on Secure Mediation Gateways, will be capable to allow secure broadcasting of the information at low and high level. The use of the new Secure Mediation Network will assure that information sharing regarding CI is mediated and elaborated to support decisions and, at the same time, it takes place in an environment of trust and security. The sharing of information requires a relationship of trust such that companies and organizations know that their sensitive data are sufficiently protected.

The CockpitCI system, including detection, prediction, alert and reaction, will be conducted by means of a reference scenario. Reference scenario identifies the portion of the interconnected SCADA system and Telco network, selects services delivered to customers, evaluates their quality (in terms of continuity, readiness, performances, time response), finds the vulnerabilities in the interconnected networks
for possible cyber attacks and cyber interdependencies between networks in order to mitigate the effects of successful cyber attacks. A reference scenario is in an operational mode when the quality of the delivered services (QoS) is within a Service Level Agreement (SLA), or in a degraded mode when QoS is outside SLA as an ultimate consequence of successful cyber attacks or other adverse events.

4. PRELIMINARY RESULTS AND CONCLUSION

The accomplishment of the proposed objectives will bring noteworthy added value to specific application scenarios. In the following, the ideas, concepts and objectives presented in the previous sections have led to the definition of the following architecture of the CockpitCI system. The envisaged CockpitCI system architecture, in the case where two interdependent CIs are considered, is shown in Figure 1.

At the bottom of the figure, a conceptual and simplified illustration of the two CIs and of their interconnection is presented. In particular, for the sake of exposition, a telecommunication CI (“TLC” in the figure) and an electric distribution network (“ELE” in the figure) are considered. For each CI, both field elements (e.g. RTUs) and the SCADA control room (“SCADA ELE” and “SCADA TLC”) are represented (the CockpitCI tool interacts both with field level devices and at control room level). Each CI has an associated CockpitCI tool. Since the CockpitCI tool must be a scalable and CI-technology independent solution, it is necessary to consider in the architecture also proper adaptors (“TLC adaptor” and “ELE adaptor” in the figure) at the interface between the CockpitCI tool and the particular CI domain. The CockpitCI tool architecture consists of three layers, namely detection layer, risk prediction layer and mediation layer.

As concerns the components lying at detection layer, they consist of (i) a centralized component, named dynamic PIDS (Perimeter Intrusion Detection System), and (ii) a set of distributed local detection agents for intrusion detection at local level (the yellow dots in the figure). The local detection agents will be able to autonomously detect and (in some cases) react to local attacks, and will provide information to distributed Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) and Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) mechanisms. Detection agents, adaptors and extensions for system components will pervade CI’s field and will be placed at the most critical sources of vulnerabilities, including RTUs and the main SCADA elements. The PIDS is a centralized component which correlates and aggregates the alerts received from the detection agents. Moreover, the PIDS has the capability to detect coordinated cyber-attacks, and to dynamically deploy containment or even preventive strategies of isolation (as an example, the PIDS could respond to detected threats by changing firewalls rules in order to redefine ICT system perimeters).

Information from local detection agents is gathered by adaptors (which perform all the needed operations in terms of filtering, aggregation, translation, etc.), and sent (in a technology independent format) to a centralized on line Integrated Risk Prediction (IRP) (at the top of the figure), which performs a situation assessment, computing the risk level associated to the current state of the CI, and evaluates the impact of cyber-attacks, suggesting also possible countermeasures. The IRP performs the above-mentioned situation assessment by properly analyzing rich input information merging both local field information (coming from the local CI Detection Layer) and global/remote information about the status of linked CIs, coming from linked IRPs. Notably, the connection between the IRP and the local detection layer is bidirectional in the sense that the results of IRP elaborations can be fed-back to the detection layer (to local detection agents and PIDS) in order to improve local detection and reaction capabilities. Hence, the output of the IRP will be provided both to control room operators and to the detection layer.

The secure and reliable communication between the detection layer and the IRP is assured by a secure mediation network, which also supports the secure exchange of data between linked CIs. So doing, it is possible to combine local and global perspectives and obtain awareness at all the levels of the system. This is essential in view of the concept of interdependence, which plays a crucial role in critical infrastructures protection. Concluding, the proposed CockpitCI architecture is functional to the achievement of the general objectives explained in the previous sections, which impose innovative technological and scientific contributions in the fields of CI modeling, cyber detection, risk prediction, adaptors design, secure mediation of data and intelligence for local autonomous reaction capabilities.

REFERENCES

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